

## POLS 632: Theory and Method in International Relations

Spring 2007

Instructor: Ahmer Tarar

The purpose of this graduate course is to introduce students to modern theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of international relations. This semester, we will focus primarily on game-theoretic and statistical approaches to the study of international conflict. The course will give you a sense of the direction that the literature on conflict is heading, so that you can identify potential research projects of your own.

The papers that we will be reading can be quite technical. We will spend the first week of class studying game theory (with possibly a second week, if necessary). When reading the papers, think about the following questions:

- (a) What question or puzzle is the author trying to address? Is it an important one?
- (b) What is the structure of the model that the author uses to try to answer the question? Is it an appropriate model for the question? What would be some interesting ways to relax the assumptions of the model?
- (c) What solution concept does the author use to solve the model? Is it an appropriate one for the author's goals?
- (d) What insight, if any, does the model provide regarding the question that the author initially asked? Was this insight already established in the literature?
- (e) Are the results of the model of a testable type, or are they just meant to provide theoretical insight? If testable, how might one go about testing the results?

Course Requirements: Each week, each student will choose a paper that they will be responsible for for the following week. For the paper that you are responsible for, you will be required to write a short paper (about 3 double-spaced pages should be enough) in which you answer the questions raised above, especially focusing on questions (a), (d), and (e). These papers must be emailed to me 48 hours before class (I will give more details at the first class session), and I will post them on the course website so that everyone can read them before class. Note that you are expected to read **all** of the assigned readings before class, not just the one that you are responsible for (I will try to keep the assigned reading load to no more than 5-6 articles per week). The class grade will be based on these short papers as well as class participation. (I will let you know the exact breakdown of these two components of your grade later in the semester, when I have more experience with how this experiment is turning out.) As graduate students, I don't expect you to miss class for anything other than extraordinary reasons. If you do have to miss a class, let me know as soon as possible in advance.

Note: For all of the topics given below, I have tried to include some of the most important works on those topics. It is important to note, however, that many important works on those topics have *not* been included. The international relations literature is immense, and if you are thinking about developing a research agenda within one of the topics listed below, it is crucial to do a comprehensive review of the relevant literature to see what has already been done. Do not make the mistake of assuming that all of the important works on these topics have been included on the syllabus.

Readings: Most of the readings are journal articles which are available from online databases (e.g., JSTOR). In case you are not already aware, almost every political science journal (even recent issues, which are not available in JSTOR) can be accessed online from the library's website. Other readings are working papers, which are usually available from the author's website. If you have trouble locating any of the required readings, let me know and I will try to help out.

Required books:

- Taylor, Michael. 1987. *The Possibility of Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended book:

- Gibbons, Robert. 1992. *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton University Press. [Or any other game theory text; a game theory text is not required, but is useful to have as a reference throughout the semester. This one is a particularly accessible text. Martin J. Osborne's *An Introduction to Game Theory* (2004, Oxford University Press) is also excellent; it is much more comprehensive, but also probably a bit more expensive, since it is only available in hardcover. But it is probably the best of the introductory game theory texts out there. I have ordered both of these texts, so both should be available at the bookstores.]

### Students With Disabilities Policy:

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact the Department of Student Life, Services for Students with Disabilities in Room 126 of the Koldus Building, or call 845-1637.

### Course Materials/Copyright Statement:

The handouts used in this course are copyrighted. By “handouts,” I mean all materials generated for this class, which include but are not limited to syllabi, quizzes, exams, lab problems, in-class materials review sheets, and additional problem sets. Because these are copyrighted, you do not have the right to copy the handouts, unless I expressly grant permission.

### Plagiarism Statement:

As commonly defined, plagiarism consists of passing off as one’s own the ideas, words, writings, etc., which belong to another. In accordance with the definition, you are committing plagiarism if you copy the work of another person and turn it in as your own, even if you should have the permission of the person. Plagiarism is one of the worst academic sins, for the plagiarist destroys the trust among colleagues without which research cannot be safely communicated. If you have any questions regarding plagiarism, please consult the latest issue of the Texas A&M University Student Rules, under the section “Scholastic Dishonesty.”

### Topics:

**0. No class on Wednesday January 17<sup>th</sup>** (get an early start on the game theory readings)

#### **1. A Primer and Introduction to Game Theory** (Wednesday January 24th)

- Gibbons, Robert. 1997. “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Winter, 1997), pp. 127-149.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. “States and Strategies.” Chapter 1 of *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press.
- Feel free to read any game theory text you can get your hands on before class (although this class will be lecture format, so that advanced reading is not required)

## 2. Rationalist Explanations for War 1: Incomplete Information

- Fearon, James. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3).
- Powell, Robert. 1999. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power." Chapter 3 of *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97(4).
- Carrubba, Clifford, Dan Reiter, and Scott Wolford. 2006. "Information, Commitment, and War." Working paper, Emory University.
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2006. "War and Incomplete Information." Working paper, Texas A&M University.

### Recommended:

- Morrow, James. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(4).
- Adam Meirowitz and Anne Sartori. "Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information." Working paper, Princeton University.
- Wittman, Donald. 1979. "How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, No. 4., pp. 743-763.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 3., pp. 469-484.
- Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6):783-813.
- Powell, Robert. 2004. "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 2., pp. 344-361.
- Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(October):819-38.
- Mattes, Michaela, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2004. "When Do They Stop?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 41(1).

- Fey, Mark, and Kristopher Ramsay. “Mutual Optimism and War.” Working paper, Princeton University.
- Banks, Jeff. 1990. “Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games.” *American Journal of Political Science* 34(3).
- Gartzke, Erik. 1999. “War is in the Error Term.” *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 3., pp. 567-587.
- Coletta, Damon, and Erik Gartzke. 2003. “Testing War in the Error Term.” *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 2., pp. 445-448.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. “Fighting Battles, Winning Wars.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 3., pp. 301-320.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Ethan R. Zorik. 1997. “Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1., pp. 15-27.
- M. Christina Molinari. 2000. “Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow and Zorick.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2., pp. 425-427.
- “A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict.” Lisa J. Carlson. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 3. (Sep, 1995), pp. 511-534.
- “A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments.” Michael Schwarz; Konstantin Sonin. Working paper, UC, Berkeley, 2004.
- “The ABC of War: Advantage, Bargaining, and Confrontation.” Clara Ponsati. Working paper, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002.

### **3. Resolving Informational Problems 1: Cheap Talk Diplomacy versus Audience Costs**

- Fearon, James. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49(3).
- Fearon, James. 1994. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.” *American Political Science Review* 88(3).

- Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 92(3).
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. "Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises." *American Political Science Review*.
- Sartori, Anne. 2002. "A Reputational Theory of Communication in Disputes." *International Organization* 56(1).
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(2):175-200.

Recommended:

- Michael Tomz. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." Forthcoming, *International Organization*.
- "Looking for Audience Costs." Kenneth A. Schultz. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 1. (Feb, 2001), pp. 32-60.
- Slantchev, Branislav. 2006. "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." *International Studies Quarterly* 50:445-77.
- Ramsay, Kristopher. 2004. "Politics at the Water's Edge." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(4).

**4. Resolving Informational Problems 2: Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Audience Costs, Military Mobilization, and Mediation**

- Kurizaki, Shuhei. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." Forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*.
- Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoglu. "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." Working paper, Texas A&M University.
- Tarar, Ahmer. "Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts and the Formal Study of Crisis Bargaining." Working paper, Texas A&M University.
- Fearon, James. 1997. "Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

- Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review* 99(5).
- Kydd, Andrew. 2003. "Which Side Are You On?" *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4).

## **5. Rationalist Explanations for War 2: Issue Indivisibilities and Commitment Problems**

- Fearon, James. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3).
- Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoglu, "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." Working paper, Texas A&M University.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Shifting Power." Chapter 4 of *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press.
- Fearon, James. "Bargaining Over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power." Working paper, Stanford University.
- Powell, Robert. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information." *American Political Science Review* 98(2).
- Powell, Robert. 2005. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization*.
- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Branislav Slantchev. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." Working paper, UCSD.

### Recommended:

- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement." *APSR* 90(4):749-64.
- Kim, Woosang, and James Morrow. 1992. "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36(4).
- Goddard, Stacie. 2006. "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy." *International Organization* 60(Winter):35-68.
- Hassner, Ron. 2003. "To Halve and To Hold." *Security Studies* 12(4):1-33.

- Toft, Monica. 2002/3. "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War." *Security Studies* 12(2):82-119.
- Toft, Monica. 2003. *The Geography of Ethnic Conflict: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Walter, Barbara. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51(3):335-64.

## 6. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Cooperation Theory

- Taylor, Michael. 1987. *The Possibility of Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- "Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific Punishments." Fiona McGillivray; Alastair Smith. *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4. (Oct, 2000), pp. 809-824.
- Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52(2).
- "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information." James D. Morrow. *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 3. (Summer, 1994), pp. 387-423.
- "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation." Andrew Kydd. *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 2. (Apr, 2000), pp. 325-357.

### Recommended:

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

## 7-8. Statistical Issues in International Relations (Selection effects and other issues; we will spend at least 2 weeks on this)

- Beck, Neal, Gary King, and Langche Zeng. 2000. "Improving Quantitative Studies of International Conflict: A Conjecture." *American Political Science Review* 94(1).

- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. "Explaining Rare Events in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer, 2001): Pp. 693-715.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. "When Can History be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference," *International Studies Quarterly*, (forthcoming, March, 2007).
- King, Gary. "Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data," [concluding comment in a symposium on the analysis of dyadic international conflict data, with papers by Donald Green, Soo Yeon Kim, and David Yoon; John Oneal and Bruce Russett; and Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz], *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Fall, 2001): Pp. 497-507.
- Tarar, Ahmer. "Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts and the Formal Study of Crisis Bargaining." Working paper, Texas A&M University.
- Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1).
- Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Kenneth A. Schultz. 2003. "Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information." *Political Analysis* 11(4).
- "Looking for Audience Costs." Kenneth A. Schultz. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 1. (Feb, 2001), pp. 32-60.
- Anne Sartori. "An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models without Exclusion Restrictions." *Political Analysis* 11:2 (Spring 2003) 111-138.
- William Reed. 2000. "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset & Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2):236-69.
- Fearon, James. 2002. "Selection Effects in Deterrence." *International Interactions* 28(1).

- Signorino, Curtis S., and Ahmer Tarar. 2006. "A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Signorino, Curtis S. 2003. "Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models." *Political Analysis* 11(4).
- Signorino, Curtis S., and Kuzey Yilmaz. 2003. "Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review*.
- Smith, Alastair. 1999. "Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4).

Recommended:

- Morton, Rebecca. 1999. *Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Remaining Topics: We will choose about 5 of the following topics (the choice may depend on student interests, or I may exercise dictatorial choice):

**9. Explanations of the Democratic Peace**

- Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce M. Russett. 1993. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 87(3):624-638.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 93:791-807.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?" *International Organization* 52:233-66.
- Tarar, Ahmer, and Bahar Leventoglu, "Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining." Working paper, Texas A&M University.
- Douglas A. Van Belle. "Press Freedom and the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 405-414 (1997).

- Erik Gartzke. “The Capitalist Peace.” Forthcoming in *American Journal of Political Science*.

Recommended:

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press.
- Kilgour, Marc. 1991. “Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2).
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie Campbell. 1991. “Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

**10. Deterrence Theory**

- Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paul Huth. “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War.” *American Political Science Review* 82,2 (1988):423-43.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2):236-69.

Recommended:

- Fearon, James. 2002. “Selection Effects in Deterrence.” *International Interactions* 28(1).
- Signorino, Curtis, and Ahmer Tarar. 2006. “A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence.” *American Journal of Political Science*.
- “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World.” Barry Nalebuff. *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3. (Apr, 1991), pp. 313-335.
- “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies.” Christopher Achen; Duncan Snidal. *World Politics*, Vol. 41, (Jan, 1989), pp. 143-169. (and associated debate in this issue)
- “Deterrence and International Conflict.” Paul Huth. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2. (Jun, 1999), pp. 25-48.

- “Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability.” Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Nov, 1991), pp. 801-832.
- “Modeling Deterrence and International Crises.” Jean-Pierre P. Langlois. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Mar, 1989), pp. 67-83.
- “Deterrence and Bargaining.” R. Harrison Wagner. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Jun, 1982), pp. 329-358.

## **11. Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense**

- Nalebuff, Barry. 1988. “Minimal Nuclear Deterrence.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Sep, 1988), pp. 411-425.
- Powell, Robert. 1987. “Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD.” *American Political Science Review* 81(3).
- Powell, Robert. 1988. “Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.” *American Political Science Review* 82(March).
- Powell, Robert. 1989. “Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation.” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2., pp. 503-519.
- Powell, Robert. 2003. “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense.” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4., pp. 86-118.
- Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: A Quantitative Model.” Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Crisis Escalation.” Daniel Geller. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Jun, 1990), pp. 291-310

## **12. Diversionary Theory of War**

- Tarar, Ahmer. 2006. “Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50(1):169-188.

- Hess, Gregory D., and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework." *American Economic Review* 85:828-846.
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 40:133-153.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, and David R. Davis. 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:814-834.
- Miller, Ross. 1995. "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force." *American Journal of Political Science* 39:760-785.
- Miller, Ross. 1999. "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43:388-402.
- Gelpi, Christopher. 1997. "Democratic Diversions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:255-282.
- Oneal, John R., and Tir, Jaroslav. (2006) "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace?" *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (4), 755-779.
- Meernik, James, and Peter Waterman. 1996. "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force." *Political Research Quarterly* 49:573-590.
- "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War." George W. Downs; David M. Roake *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 2. (May, 1994), pp. 362-380.
- Levy, Jack S. 1989. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." In *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky, pp.259-288. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

### 13. Alliances

- Powell, Robert. 1999. "Alignment Decisions in the Shadow of Power." Chapter 5 of *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press.
- Morrow, James. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4).

- Morrow, James. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2):270-97.
- Morrow, James. 1993. "Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security." *International Organization* 47(2): 207-33.
- Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4):405-26.
- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 2004. "Stable Alliance Formation in Distributional Conflict." *European Journal of Political Economy* 20(4).

Recommended:

- Sorokin, Gerald. 1994. "Alliance Formation and General Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(2).
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1).
- "An Economic Theory of Alliances." Mancur Olson; Richard Zeckhauser. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 48, No. 3. (Aug, 1966), pp. 266-279.
- "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" James D. Morrow. *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3. (Jun, 2000), pp. 63-83.

#### **14. Terrorism**

- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2005. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." *International Organization* 59(1):145-176.
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2005. "The Quality of Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):515-530.
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson. 2007. "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2).
- "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence" (Andy Kydd and Barbara Walter). *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002) pp. 263-296

- Navin A. Bapat. 2006. "State Bargaining with Transnational Terrorist Groups." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(2): 215-232.
- Todd Sandler. "Transnational Terrorism: An Economic Analysis," in H.W. Richardson, P. Gordon, and J.E. Moore II (eds.), *The Economic Impact of Terrorist Attacks* (Elgar, 2005) pp. 11-34.
- Robert Pape. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97.3 (August 2003) p.343-361.

Recommended:

- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2007. "Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterrorism." *International Organization* 61(1).
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2005. "The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2):237-258.
- "Strategies of Terrorism." (Andy Kydd and Barbara Walter). *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006) pp. 49-80.
- Many papers on Todd Sandler's website

**15. Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflict**

- "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." (James Fearon and David Laitin) *American Political Science Review* 90, 4 (December 1996), 715-35.
- Fearon and Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* Volume: 97 Page: 75-90 Year: FEB 2003
- James Fearon. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, 3 (May 2004), 275-302.
- James Fearon. "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict." In David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach." David T. Mason; Patrick J. Fett. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 4. (Dec, 1996), pp. 546-568.

- More articles to be added here

## 16. Balance of Power

- Powell, Robert. 1999. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power." Chapter 3 of *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1986. "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power." *World Politics* 38(4):546-76.
- Wagner, Harrison. 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *American Political Science Review* 88(3).
- Niou, Emerson, and Peter Ordeshook. 1987. "Preventive War and the Balance of Power." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31(3).
- Niou, Emerson, and Peter Ordeshook. 1990. "Stability in Anarchic International Systems." *American Political Science Review* 84(4).
- Niou, Emerson, and Peter Ordeshook. 1994. "Alliances in Anarchic International Systems." *International Studies Quarterly* 38(2).

## 17. Two-Level Games (Domestic Politics and International Bargaining)

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games." *International Organization* 42 (Summer): 427-460.
- Iida, Keisuke. 1993. "When and How do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-level Games with Uncertainty." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (September): 403-426.
- Mo, Jongryn. 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-level Games." *American Political Science Review* 89 (December): 914-924.
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2001. "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 320-340.
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2005. "Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3):383-407.

- Leventoglu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining." *American Political Science Review* 99(3):419-433.
- Pahre, Robert. 1997. "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:147-174.

## **18. International Institutions**

- "The Rational Design of International Institutions." Barbara Koremenos; Charles Lipson; Duncan Snidal. *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 4. (Oct, 2001), pp. 761-800. (and associated articles in this special issue)
- Fang, Songying. "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics." Working paper, University of Minnesota.
- Fang, Songying. "The Strategic Use of International Institutions in Dispute Settlement." Working paper, University of Minnesota.
- Eric Voeten. "Outside Options and The Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* December 2001, pp 845-858.
- Eric Voeten. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force ." *International Organization*, Summer 2005, pp. 527-57.
- Terrence Chapman. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy." Forthcoming in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

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